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Mass infection is not an 
option: we must do 
more to protect our 
young
As the third wave of the pandemic 
takes hold across England, the UK 
Government plans to further re-open 
the nation. Implicit in this decision 
is the acceptance that infections will 
surge, but that this does not matter 
because vaccines have “broken the link 
between infection and mortality”.1 On 
July 19, 2021—branded as Freedom 
Day—almost all restrictions are set 
to end. We believe this decision is 
dangerous and premature.
An end to the pandemic through 
population immunity requires enough 
of the population to be immune 
to prevent exponential growth of 
SARS-CoV-2. Population immunity 
is unlikely to be achieved without 
much higher levels of vaccination 
than can be reasonably expected 
by July 19, 2021. Proportionate 
mitigations will be needed to avoid 
hundreds of thousands of new 
infections, until many more are 
vaccinated. Nevertheless, the UK 
Government’s  intention to ease 
restrictions from July 19, 2021, means 
that immunity will be achieved 
by vaccination for some people 
but by natural infection for others 
(predominantly the young). The UK 
Health Secretary has stated that daily 
cases could reach 100 000 per day over 
the summer months of 2021.2 The link 
between infection and death might 
have been weakened, but it has not 
been broken, and infection can still 
cause substantial morbidity in both 
acute and long-term illness. We have 
previously pointed to the dangers 
of relying on immunity by natural 
infection,3 and we have five main 
concerns with the UK Government’s 
plan to lift all restrictions at this stage 
of the pandemic.
First, unmitigated transmission 
will disproportionately affect unvac-
cinated children and young people 
who have already suffered greatly. 
Official UK Government data show 
that as of July 4, 2021, 51% of the 
total UK population have been fully 
vaccinated and 68% have been partially 
vaccinated. Even assuming that 
approximately 20% of unvaccinated 
people are protected by previous 
SARS-CoV-2 infection, this still leaves 
more than 17 million people with no 
protection against COVID-19. Given 
this, and the high transmissibility of the 
SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant, exponential 
growth will probably continue until 
millions more people are infected, 
leaving hundreds of thousands of 
people with long-term illness and 
disability.4 This strategy risks creating 
a generation left with chronic health 
problems and disability, the personal 
and economic impacts of which might 
be felt for decades to come.
Second, high rates of transmission 
in schools and in children will lead to 
significant educational disruption, a 
problem not addressed by abandoning 
isolation of exposed children (which 
is done on the basis of imperfect 
daily rapid tests).5 The root cause of 
educational disruption is transmission, 
not isolation. Strict mitigations in 
schools alongside measures to keep 
community transmission low and 
eventual vaccination of children will 
ensure children can remain in schools 
safely.6–8 This is all the more important 
for clinically and socially vulnerable 
children. Allowing transmission to 
continue over the summer will create 
a reservoir of infection, which will 
probably accelerate spread when 
schools and universities re-open in 
autumn.
Third, preliminary modelling data9 
suggest the government’s strategy 
provides fertile ground for the emer-
gence of vaccine-resistant variants. This 
would place all at risk, including those 
already vaccinated, within the UK and 
globally. While vaccines can be updated, 
this requires time and resources, leaving 
many exposed in the interim. Spread of 
potentially more transmissible escape 
variants would disproportionately affect 
the most disadvantaged in our country 
and other countries with poor access to 
vaccines.
Fourth, this strategy will have a 
significant impact on health services 
and exhausted health-care staff who 
have not yet recovered from previous 
infection waves. The link between 
cases and hospital admissions has not 
been broken, and rising case numbers 
will inevitably lead to increased 
hospital admissions, applying further 
pressure at a time when millions 
of people are waiting for medical 
procedures and routine care.
Fifth, as deprived communities are 
more exposed to and more at risk 
from COVID-19, these policies will 
continue to disproportionately affect 
the most vulnerable and marginalised, 
deepening inequalities.
In light of these grave risks, and 
given that vaccination offers the 
prospect of quickly reaching the 
same goal of population immunity 
without incurring them, we consider 
any strategy that tolerates high levels 
of infection to be both unethical 
and illogical. The UK Government 
must reconsider its current strategy 
and take urgent steps to protect the 
public, including children. We believe 
the government is embarking on a 
dangerous and unethical experiment, 
and we call on it to pause plans to 
abandon mitigations on July 19, 2021.
Instead, the government should 
delay complete re-opening until 
everyone, including adolescents, have 
been offered vaccination and uptake is 
high, and until mitigation measures, 
especially adequate ventilation 
(through investment in CO² monitors 
and air filtration devices) and spacing 
(eg, by reducing class sizes), are in place 
in schools. Until then, public health 
measures must include those called 
for by WHO (universal mask wearing 
in indoor spaces, even for those 
vaccinated), the Scientific Advisory 
Group for Emergencies (SAGE), 
the US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (ventilation and air 
filtration), and Independent SAGE 
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of vaccination in this population 
warrants evaluation.
To analyse the immunogenicity 
of the BNT162b2 mRNA vaccine 
(Pfizer–BioNTech), we used the IgG 
II Quant Assay (Abbot Laboratories, 
Wiesbaden, Germany) to quantify 
spike glyco protein-specific IgG 
receptor-binding domain (IgG[S-RBD]) 
levels at a median of 28 days 
(IQR 26–31) after the second vaccine 
dose in 88 recipients who had 
received two successive doses (at 
4-week interval) at a median of 
23 months (range 3–213 [IQR 9–30]) 
after allogeneic HSCT. IgG(S-RBD) 
titres could be quantified in 69 (78%) 
participants, whereas IgG(S-RBD) 
was detected but not quantifiable 
in three participants (anti-S titre 
<21 arbitrary unit [AU] per mL) 
and not detected in 16 participants 
(anti-S titre <6·8 AU/mL). In parallel, 
nucleoprotein-specific IgG was 
detected in seven of 88 participants, 
denoting previous SARS-CoV-2 
exposure.
As previously reported for surrogate 
measure of vaccine protection, we 
stratified samples by IgG(S-RBD) titres 
above or below 4160 AU/mL as this 
threshold has previously been shown 
to correspond to a 0·95 probability 
of virus neutralisation in in-vitro 
plaque reduction neutralisation tests.3 
In a comparison of characteristics 
of patients with IgG(S-RBD) titres 
above (n=52) and below (n=36) this 
threshold, a time interval greater 
than 12 months between HSCT and 
vaccination, as well as an absolute 
lymphocyte count in peripheral blood 
above 1G/L at the time of vaccination 
correlated with protective IgG(S-RBD) 
titres after vaccination (appendix). 
In comparison, participants who 
had received systemic im muno-
sup pres sive drugs within 3 months 
of vaccination had subprotective 
IgG(S-RBD) titres. Systemic immu-
nosuppressive treatments within 
3 months of vaccination, together 
with a lymphocyte count below 
1 G/L in peripheral blood, remained 
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(effective border quarantine; test, trace 
isolate, and support). This will ensure 
that everyone is protected and make 
it much less likely that we will need 
further restrictions or lockdowns in the 
autumn.
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Antibody response after 
second BNT162b2 dose 
in allogeneic HSCT 
recipients
The prognosis of COVID-19 infection 
is poor in haematopoietic stem-
cell transplant (HSCT) recipients.1,2 
In a large multicentric series of 
318 HSCT recipients (184 allogeneic 
HSCT recipients and 134 autologous 
HSCT recipients), the probability of 
overall survival at 30 days after the 
diagnosis of COVID-19 infection 
was notably dismal,  at 68% 
(95% CI 58–77) and 67% (55–78) 
for allogeneic HSCT recipients 
and autologous HSCT recipients, 
respectively.1 Immuno com promised 
patients have been excluded from 
initial studies of SARS-CoV-2 mRNA 
vaccine efficacy, so the efficacy 
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